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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002719

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, AND
KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM

REF: A. 04 GENEVA 2992 (JCIC-XXVI-040)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020)
[1](#)C. GENEVA 2712 (JCIC-XXVII-038)
[1](#)D. GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034)
[1](#)E. STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-039.
- [1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 2, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Working Group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on November 2, 2005, to discuss the Ukrainian proposal for elimination of the SS-24 rocket motor cases, the draft Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers, and the Russian proposal on reductions to the boundaries of the Kartaly Site Diagram.

[1](#)4. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation restated its position to propose a change to the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol which would permit the drilling of holes into the upper end dome of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs as a means of eliminating the motor casings. The U.S. Delegation informed Ukraine that it was not convinced that drilling holes in the motor cases would serve as an acceptable substitute for the existing elimination procedures outlined in the C or E Protocol. The Ukrainian Delegation suggested a potential demonstration of the ability of the motor case to sustain pressure after the holes have been drilled, as well as providing additional technical data concerning the effect of drilling holes into the motor casing.

[1](#)5. (S) The Parties also discussed the draft Statements of Policy for Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections. The Russians proposed that the paragraph, that referenced the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM, be an independent statement relative to the rest of the proposal and requested that it be moved to the last paragraph of the document. They also clarified that the Russian proposal was to request one removal for each Trident type, for a total of two each year. The Russians suggested the United States consider language to distinguish the difference between requesting removal of a Trident from its container under the Statements of Policy versus requesting removal of a Trident from its container pursuant to Treaty right. The United States responded to all points stating that it would take the proposal under consideration and prepare a response.

[1](#)6. (S) Finally, the U.S. Delegation informed Russia that its proposed reductions to the site diagram boundaries of the Kartaly Maintenance Facility should be acceptable, but that the United States preferred to wait until after the close-out inspection had been completed before finalizing the JCIC S-Series Joint Statement (JS). The Russian Delegation replied that it would be unprecedented to change the boundaries of a formerly-declared facility (FDF) and suggested that Russia would have no reason to initial the JS after the close-out had been completed.

UPDATE ON UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL
FOR SS-24 ELIMINATION

- [1](#)7. (S) Shevtsov opened the meeting by stating that the

United States had received the draft text of a JCIC JS on the draft JCIC Agreement regarding changes to the C or E Protocol concerning additional procedures for the elimination of SS-24 ICBMs, provided on October 25, 2004 (REF A), and stated that Ukraine had not received any feedback on the proposal. Since it had not received a response, Ukraine was unsure what course to take, so it proceeded to further analyze the effect drilled holes would have on pressurized motor casings. He said that all offers and assurances from the first part of JCIC-XXVII (June 2005) (REF B) remained in effect. He expressed concern that the issue may be impacted by what Ukraine wanted to do regarding the change-in-function of the Pavlograd C or E Facility discussed earlier that day during a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting (REF C). Shevtsov stated that, if the Pavlograd C or E Facility were to change its function, Ukraine must know, in advance, what procedures the United States would find acceptable to consider the SS-24 solid rocket motors to have been eliminated. This would allow Ukraine to select an appropriate location, develop procedures, and allow for inspections without any undue delay.

18. (S) Fedorchenko voiced his support with the Ukrainian proposal, stating that there was merit in changing the C or E Protocol based on how long this issue had been discussed in the JCIC and remained unresolved.

19. (S) Mullins acknowledged that the United States had reviewed and studied the Ukrainian-proposed elimination procedures with an eye towards resolution within the confines of the C or E Protocol. The United States remained unconvinced that the proposed method sufficiently altered the motor casing for it to be considered eliminated under the Treaty. The United States was willing to listen to any other information the Ukrainians had to offer, to include alternate methods of elimination or additional technical data on SS-24 motor stage construction.

110. (S) Shevtsov stated he wanted to ensure that he understood the U.S. position correctly, that the United States would not consider the missile eliminated if Ukraine used the proposed method of drilling additional holes in the end dome. He opined that the motor case theoretically could not be pressurized to the point of being operationally used as an ICBM solid rocket motor after the holes were drilled. He offered to provide additional technical data on the effects of the drilled holes on the motor case and then proposed that Ukraine host a physical demonstration of the case's inability to be pressurized, which would be paid for by the United States. Mullins completed the discussion by once again stating that the United States was willing to receive any additional information or alternative methods for elimination from the Ukrainian Delegation.

TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS

11. (S) The following Russian proposal for U.S. and other Parties' Statements of Policy (SOP) on Trident in Containers was the subject of the next Working Group discussion.

Begin text:

Official Translation
JCIC-XXVII
Draft Proposed by the
Russian Side
November 1, 2005

Statement of Policy by (the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine) Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes During Data Update Inspections

(Name of Party) makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading tube, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors, during all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the date of this statement, at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, to use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading tube, respectively.

(Name of Party) will as a matter of policy, instruct its

inspectors to request the removal of an SLBM of these types from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States of America that safety and security considerations and time constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base will not permit all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs. (Name of Party) understands that some access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during future inspections, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors to use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 2000 demonstrations.

- For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or loading tube, respectively. The inspection team may request the same access hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading tubes.

- The United States of America will respond to any such requests to remove these access hatches from particular liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not deviate from established safety and security procedures.

(Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States of America that inspection time constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches that can be removed during an inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the United States of America will be prepared to implement the above procedures for each data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date of this statement.

(Name of Party) notes that this statement of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that:

- 1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;
- 2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm missile type using the procedures contained in the statements of policy; and,
- 3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

(Name of Party) understands that the use of the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth above.

Statement of Policy by the United States of America
Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and
Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes
During Data Update Inspections

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data update inspections.

Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading tube, the United States of America expects that, during all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the

date of this statement at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, inspection teams will use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading tube, respectively.

The United States of America understands that the inspecting Party will, as a matter of policy, request the removal of an SLBM of these types from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year.

The United States of America notes that safety and security considerations and time constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine Bases will not permit all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs. The United States of America also notes that some access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to confirm their type.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during future inspections, the United States of America will use the following procedures:

- At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the in-country escort.

- These two liners or loading tubes will have the same hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 2000 demonstrations.

- For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or loading tube, respectively. The inspection team may request the same access hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be removed from these liners or loading tubes.

- The United States of America will respond to any such requests to remove these access hatches from particular liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not deviate from established safety and security procedures.

The United States of America notes that inspection time constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches that can be removed during an inspection.

The United States of America will be prepared to implement the above procedures for each data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date of this statement.

The United States of America notes that this statement of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that:

- 1) were recorded in the report for that inspection;
- 2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm missile type using the procedures contained in the statements of policy; and,
- 3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

The United States of America understands that the use of the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring of the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth above.

End text.

12. (S) Mullins stated that the U.S. Delegation had reviewed the Russian Delegation's proposal on Tridents in Containers

and highlighted the differences between the U.S. and Russian proposals, as follows:

- Treaty Right Paragraph. Mullins noted that the first major change was the Russian move of the paragraph that referenced the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM. This paragraph was moved to the end of the proposal. Fedorchenko stated that this paragraph did not raise any concerns, but he believed it to be independent of the rest of the proposal, so as to not mix proposed SOP with Treaty rights. Mullins acknowledged the proposed paragraph move, but also noted the omission of the phrase, "in good faith." Fedorchenko fervently acknowledged the omission and stated that the noted phrase was "redundant and irritating." Fedorchenko added that he believed the Russian inspectors at the facilities would work in good faith. Mullins categorically acknowledged Fedorchenko's statement and added that all inspectors work in good faith, as well as all of the delegates within the working groups.

- Trident I and II Removal Request. Mullins sought clarification on the Russian's proposed statement that requested the removal of an SLBM "of these types" from its liner or loading tube no more than once each year. Fedorchenko agreed to delete the phrase, "of these types," but stated that Russia's intent was to request one removal of each type of SLBM (for a total of two opportunities, one Trident I and one Trident II) each year. Mullins stated that the U.S. position was to allow the removal of only one SLBM (i.e., one opportunity) per Treaty year, but would take Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and respond later.

- Proposed Policy Versus Treaty Right. Fedorchenko proposed to distinguish the difference between the removal of a Trident from its container as a matter of policy versus requesting a removal of a Trident from its container pursuant to Treaty right. In an attempt to make this distinction, Fedorchenko suggested utilizing the phrase "verification removal," which he defined as a confirmation of what the Russians were shown in the demonstration, for the sake of verifying the procedures. Fedorchenko explained that the term "verification removal" would identify the removal request as a matter of policy, so as not to be confused with a removal request made pursuant to Treaty right. He distinguished this point by illustrating that Russia did not want to lose its ability to request a removal under the SOP as a "verification removal" if earlier in the same Treaty year it exercised its Treaty right to request a removal because the inspection team could not confirm the type of missile. Mullins stated that the United States would take Fedorchenko's proposal under consideration and prepare a response.

KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM
REDUCTION -- RUSSIA JUST
TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF U.S.

13. (S) Mullins raised for discussion the issue of the Russian-proposed changes to the Kartaly Maintenance Facility site diagram. He stated that the United States was planning for the close-out inspection of the Kartaly Silo ICBM Base and intended to use the site diagram of the Kartaly Maintenance Facility, dated January 1, 1999, for that inspection. He confirmed with Fedorchenko that Russia's proposal, as reflected in the new draft S-Series JS provided on October 31, 2005 (REF D), called for the use of the existing site diagram (1999) for the close-out inspection and the use of the new site diagram with the reduced boundaries for any subsequent FDF inspections at Kartaly. Mullins informed Fedorchenko that the United States should be able to accommodate the proposed reduction, but preferred to wait until after the close-out inspection had been completed before finalizing the JCIC S-Series JS. He said that by doing it this way would make for a simpler JS that could be either initialed at the next JCIC session or arrangements could be made to initial it in capitals during the intersession.

14. (S) Fedorchenko responded that the new Russian-provided S-Series JS could only be initialed at this session and he did not understand why the United States wanted to wait because it made no sense to initial the paper after the close-out had been conducted. He suggested that the proposal should be dropped from the agenda, which would result in inspectors facing difficult times at that facility over the next four years, since the site would be abandoned with no one to watch over it. Only those few buildings remaining on the site diagram would be in good shape. He then opined that he could not imagine what the S-Series JS would look like after the completion of the close-out.

15. (S) Fedorchenko reminded the U.S. Delegation of the Russian notification of the closure of Kartaly transmitted on October 21, 2005 (REF E), and that the close-out needed to be

completed prior to December 20, 2005. He said that it would be unprecedented for the boundaries of an FDF to be changed and he did not believe that Russia would have any reason to initial the JS after the close-out. Mullins observed that initialing the JS after the close-out would ensure that any future FDF inspection would be conducted only against the five remaining buildings and not the entire site. Fedorchenko said that Russia just wanted to take care of the U.S. inspectors, but it did not appear that the United States wanted to take care of its inspectors. He concluded by implying that, with the number of FDF facilities and the annual quota of FDF inspections permitted under the Treaty, an FDF inspection may never be conducted at Kartaly.

116. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:
-- Russian-Proposed Draft of Coordinated Plenary
Statement for Trident II RVOSI Procedures, dated November 2, 2005

117. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Mezhenyy
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Col Razumov
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
Mr. Dotsenko

118. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley